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Introduction
Between 8:30 and 9:00 a.m. on 16 June 1948, three Europeans were shot
dead in the Sungei Siput area of Perak in northern Malaya. The three were es-
tate managers of rubber plantations, and the perpetrators were guerrillas in
the “mobile corps” of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). The shootings
were the culmination of a long series of attacks and “outrages” against estate
managers in Penang, Selangor, and the southern state of Johore. Late that af-
ternoon, the colonial government declared a state of emergency in Perak and
Johore that was extended, two days later, to the whole of Malaya. An immedi-
ate casualty was respect for civil liberties. Under emergency regulations the
authorities enacted a range of draconian measures, including a ban on “sedi-
tious” publications; the introduction of coercive powers of detention, arrest,
trial, deportation, and “banishment”; the establishment of the death penalty
for anyone carrying unauthorized ªrearms; and the registration of the entire
adult population. On 17 July 1948 the government banned the MCP itself
and carried out more than a thousand arrests.1 The Malayan Emergency had
begun.2 Although the state of emergency lasted until 31 July 1960, the out-
come of the insurgency—the complete defeat of the Communist rebels by the
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1. Various MCP “front” organizations were also banned, including the New Democratic Youth
League, the Indian New Democratic Youth League, and the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army Ex-
Servicemen’s Association. By the end of 1948, 1,779 Communists were held in detention, and another
637 as well as 3,148 family members were deported. Every person over twelve was photographed,
ªngerprinted, and issued with a National Registration and Identity Card.
2. Although the conºict in Malaya bore many of the characteristics of a colonial war, the misnomer
“emergency” was used throughout the twelve years. Similarly MCP guerrillas were labeled “bandits”
(and later “Communist terrorists”), and the British counterinsurgency was termed the “Anti-Bandit
Campaign.” The reasons for this are discussed in Phillip Deery, “The Terminology of Terrorism:
Malaya, 1948–52,” Journal of Southeast Asia Studies, Vol. 34, No. 2 (June 2003), pp. 231–247.
British and colonial army, police, and security services—was ensured by
1958.3
In mid-1948 the British Labour government led by Clement Attlee was
preoccupied with the containment of the Soviet Union in Europe.4 By then,
the bolts of the Iron Curtain had tightened: The democratically elected gov-
ernment in Czechoslovakia was displaced by a Soviet-engineered coup d’état,5
Soviet attacks on the Marshall Plan had sharpened, and the eleven-month
Berlin Blockade, which to British government ofªcials resembled incipient
war, had commenced. The specter of another catastrophic European conºict
haunted the British Foreign Ofªce.6 Its pugnacious Foreign Secretary, Ernest
Bevin, worked indefatigably—and, ultimately, successfully—to persuade the
United States to participate in a military alliance, the nascent North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), that would provide Western Europe with a
bulwark against Soviet expansion.
When the crisis broke out in Malaya, however, Great Britain was sud-
denly obliged to look eastward. The Cold War in Southeast Asia became a re-
ality. With an empire stretching from India to Singapore, Britain had long
seen a special role for itself in the Far East. In addition to maintaining links
with the Commonwealth countries, Britain had close ties with Siam, a treaty
with Burma, friendly relations with the French and Dutch (each anxious to re-
colonize Indochina and Indonesia respectively), and a direct presence in Hong
Kong, Borneo, and Malaya. Britain’s interest in the region was economic as
much as strategic, and the Attlee administration for both reasons was nervous
about the possible encroachment of Communism into Southeast Asia:
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3. The year 1958 witnessed an unprecedented level of MCP surrenders that undermined the insur-
gency. See Kumar Ramakrishna, “Content, Credibility and Context: Propaganda, Government Sur-
render Policy and the Malayan Communist Terrorist Mass Surrenders of 1958,” Intelligence and
National Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Winter 1999), pp. 242–266.
4. Ann Deighton, ed., Britain and the First Cold War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), chs. 2, 9.
Labour was in ofªce from 1945 until 1951, when it was defeated by the Conservatives led by Winston
Churchill.
5. On the Foreign Ofªce’s awareness of the Soviet Union’s complicity in the coup and the murder
through defenestration of Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk, see Igor Lukes, “The Czecho-
slovak Intelligence Service and Western Reactions to the Communist Coup d’État of February 1948,”
Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 8, No. 4 (October 1993), p. 81. British Foreign Secretary Ernest
Bevin regarded the coup as a deªning moment. On 25 February he told the U.S. ambassador: “We are
now in a crucial period of six to eight weeks which will decide the future of Europe.” Quoted in Peter
Hennessy, Never Again: Britain 1945–51 (London: Jonathon Cape, 1992), p. 350.
6. According to the historian Alan Bullock, most Britons at the time were convinced “that there was a
real danger of the Soviet Union and other communists taking advantage of the weakness of Western
Europe to extend their power. We know now that this did not follow, but nobody knew it at the time.
This was a generation for whom war and occupation were not remote hypotheses but recent and terri-
ble experiences.” Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945–1951 (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1983), p. 345.
[T]here is a distinct danger that, as measures are developed for the security of
Europe and the Middle East, pressure [from the Soviet Union] upon South East
Asia will increase. Conditions there are generally speaking favourable for the
spread of Communism, and if the general impression prevails in South East Asia
that the Western Powers are both unwilling and unable to assist in resisting Rus-
sian pressure . . . eventually the whole of South East Asia will fall a victim to the
Communist advance and thus come under Russian domination.7
A crucial Western power that was “unwilling”—but not “unable”—to be
drawn into the region, despite the persistent exhortations of Bevin and For-
eign Ofªce ofªcials, was the United States.8 Until the outbreak of the Korean
War in June 1950, the U.S. State Department avoided any signiªcant com-
mitment—political, economic, or military—in a region that it considered
primarily a British and French sphere of inºuence.9
Hence, at least until 1950, Britain had to act on its own in Malaya. From
1948 until 1957, when the back of the MCP insurgency was broken, the Brit-
ish sank immense resources into the campaign. By October 1950, Britain had
committed twenty-one infantry regiments, two armored car regiments, and
one commando brigade, totaling nearly 50,000 troops.10 The British govern-
ment spent at least £520 million, and an ofªcial estimate put the overall cost
at £700 million.11 By late 1948, the state of emergency in Malaya was costing
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7. Colonial Ofªce Memorandum, 23 March 1949, CO 967/84, National Archives of the United
Kingdom (henceforth NAUK).
8. Indicative of Bevin’s more bellicose position was the seminal Cabinet paper he wrote in March 1948
pointedly titled “The Threat to Western Civilisation,” attached to Memorandum, 3 March 1948,
CAB 129/25 (CP 48/72), NAUK.
9. “Report of Discussions of Far Eastern Affairs in Preparation for Conversations with Mr. Bevin,”
13 September 1949, 890.00/9–1349, transcribed in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1949, Vol. VII, pp. 1204–1208 (hereinafter referred to as FRUS, with appropriate year
and volume numbers). The Foreign Ofªce believed that “the full development of [Southeast Asia] can
only be brought about with United States assistance, but at present there is an obvious reluctance
on the part of the Americans to risk a further loss after their experience in China.” “The United King-
dom in Southeast Asia and the Far East,” Memorandum from Ernest Bevin, 18 October 1949, CP
(49)207, CAB 129/37/1, NAUK. Richie Ovendale suggests that the U.S. administration was “wary”
because it was “conscious that much of Asia was unconvinced of its devotion to peace, its lack of impe-
rialistic ambition, and its interest in Asian freedom and progress.” He also refers to American “naivety
and selªshness” at this time. Richie Ovendale, “Britain, the United States, and the Cold War in South-
East Asia, 1949–1950,” International Affairs (London), Vol. 58, No. 3 (Summer 1982), pp. 447, 462–
463.
10. E. Shinwell, Secretary of State for War to Cabinet Defence Committee, Top Secret Minute,
24 October 1950, DO (50)92, CAB 21/1682, NAUK. The combined numbers of police and troops
expanded from 11,000 in 1947 to 69,000 in 1951. For an excellent discussion of British force deploy-
ments during the Malayan Emergency, see Karl Hack, Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia:
Britain, Malaya and Singapore, 1941–1968 (London: Curzon, 2001), ch. 4, esp. pp. 143–149.
11. “Review of the Emergency in Malaya from June 1948 to August 1957 by the Director of Opera-
tions, Malaya” (Secret), p. 19, Item 1968/4248, Series A452/2, National Archives of Australia (NAA).
Britain 250,000–300,000 Malayan dollars a day.12 In 1951 alone, the emer-
gency cost the British government £69.8 million.13 This is especially
signiªcant when we consider the state of the British Exchequer in the late
1940s. World War II had drained the British economy to such an extent that
it could scarcely meet existing commitments, let alone accept new ones. The
very economic viability of the country seemed in doubt, especially during the
“dollar gap” crisis of 1947. As one of Attlee’s chief advisers wrote in December
1947:
[W]e are a bankrupt nation. It will tax our strength and determination to the ut-
most during the next years to provide for our necessary imports by exports. Un-
til we succeed we shall only keep alive through the charity of our friends.14
In addition, exports in 1947–1948 had been crippled by a severe fuel crisis,
the product of an unusually cold winter that gripped most of Europe. Fears of
imminent economic depression were widespread. These problems arose at a
time when government spending had been sharply increasing to create an
elaborate welfare state. A vast program of state socialization in sectors ranging
from coal mines to national health moved ahead, but the government’s capac-
ity to pay for its domestic legislation was in doubt. Austerity, far from being a
mere catchphrase mouthed by British leaders to justify continued wartime ra-
tioning, was of crucial inºuence on diplomatic relations and strategic initia-
tives.
This economic imperative explains, in part, the relentless British pressure
(especially throughout 1947) on the United States to commit itself to the
ªght against Communism abroad. The Marshall Plan and the Berlin airlift
testiªed to that commitment in Europe, but in Malaya the story was different.
The U.S. refusal to help Britain in Malaya became evident on 22 June 1948,
four days after the declaration of a state of emergency in the Malayan Federa-
tion, when the deputy commissioner of police for Malaya met with the U.S.
consul in Kuala Lumpur to request assistance. Speciªcally, he wished to ac-
quire ten thousand U.S. Army 30-caliber Winchester carbines and two mil-
lion rounds of ammunition. These guns, he claimed, would be “ideal” for the
special constabulary then being formed to counter the Communist insur-
gency but were unobtainable from the manufacturer. The consul declined to
approve the request and instead simply recommended that the deputy com-
missioner contact the Malayan Chief Secretary. At a subsequent meeting the
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12. Malaya Department of Information, Communist Banditry in Malaya: The Emergency, June 1949–
December 1949 (Kuala Lumpur: Standard Engravers and Art Printers, 1950), p. 8.
13. “Briefs (Economic and Financial) for the Secretary of State’s Visit to Malaya: 10. Cost of the
Emergency,” n.d., CO1030/403, NAUK.
14. Memorandum by Sir Henry Tizard, COS(47)251, DEFE 5/6, NAUK.
consul noted that the deputy commissioner had told him “despondently” that
he was referring the matter to the British Colonial Ofªce.15
The question that therefore arises—and is a core concern of this article—
is why at this time of acute ªnancial difªculty, without crucial American sup-
port, the Labour government committed itself to a costly campaign in a col-
ony whose demand for Merdeka (independence) seemed on the verge of being
realized.16 This article answers that question in three ways. First, it surveys and
challenges contemporary and historical judgments concerning the origins of
the Malayan Emergency. Second, it shows that these origins cannot be under-
stood without recognizing the inºuence of indigenous pressures and internal
developments that were more crucial than the role of the external Cold War
dimension. The article thereby restores the agency of “local” actors. Third, it
suggests that the MCP insurrection, far from being meticulously prepared
and carefully coordinated as is often alleged, was inadequately planned and
poorly executed. In line with other relatively recent interpretations, this article
presents a more subtle and complex picture of the origins of the Malayan
Emergency than many earlier studies have portrayed.17
Contemporary Assessments
The predominant explanation for both the origins of the insurgency and Brit-
ain’s determination to defeat it, an explanation put forth at the time and, as
we shall see, still accepted by commentators today, was the external threat of
Communism posed by the Cold War. An ofªcial report, marked “secret” and
written by the Director of Operations in Malaya, Lt. Gen. R. H. Bowen,
summarized this view:
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15. “Discussion of Present Situation in Malaya with Government Authorities,” William M. Blue,
Kuala Lumpur, to Secretary of State, 28 June 1948, 846E.00/6–2848, Record Group (RG) 59, Gen-
eral Records of the Department of State, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).
16. Independence was achieved during the Malayan Emergency on 31 August 1957. An analysis of the
pressures for decolonization and the steps along the way is outside the scope of this article. As A. J.
Stockwell concludes, the insurgency probably “did not in itself determine the speed or the manner of
Britain’s departure from Malaya.” A. J. Stockwell, “Insurgency and Decolonization during the Ma-
layan Emergency,” Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 1987),
p. 80. Karl Hack concludes that the question of the Emergency’s impact on decolonization remains
“unanswerable.” See Hack, Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia, p. 137. For an excellent over-
view of the path to decolonization, see A. J. Stockwell, “British Imperial Policy and Decolonization in
Malaya, 1942–52,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 13, No. 1 (October 1984),
pp. 68–87.
17. Notable exceptions are A. J. Stockwell, “‘A Widespread and Long-Concocted Plot to Overthrow
Government in Malaya?’ The Origins of the Malayan Emergency,” Journal of Imperial and Common-
wealth History, Vol. 21, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 72–79; and T. N. Harper, The End of Empire and
the Making of Malaya (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
The Malayan Communist Party campaign is part of a wider Soviet-inspired
drive to obtain control of what is strategically and economically one of the most
important areas of South-East Asia. . . . In June 1948, on the instructions of the
Cominform issued at two conferences in Calcutta four months earlier, the MCP
started a campaign of murder, sabotage and terrorism designed to paralyse the
Government and develop into armed revolution.18
These assertions—of Soviet inspiration, Cold War expansionism, MCP initi-
ation, and, signiªcantly, Calcutta as the conduit for instructions from the
Soviet-led Communist Information Bureau (Cominform)—were echoed in
various forms by the Attlee administration. When the British secretary of state
for the colonies, Arthur Creech Jones, justiªed his authorization of the ban-
ning of the MCP and allied organizations in July 1948, he referred to the
MCP as “the nerve centre of the whole subversive movement.”19 Both the Co-
lonial Ofªce in October and the Cabinet Malaya Committee in November
1948 emphasized the “substantial grounds for regarding the Malayan out-
break as stimulated by Moscow” and the existence of a “Communist plot” to
overthrow the Malayan government by armed force.20 A lengthy memoran-
dum prepared for the Cabinet by the permanent under-secretary of state in
October 1949 warned of dangers that “will affect the whole security of South-
East Asia” from “a powerful Communist Fifth Column, corroding from
within.”21 Moscow’s role was emphasized by the head of Security Intelligence,
Far East, who warned that the Soviet Union in all likelihood controlled the
growing local Communist parties in Southeast Asia.22 The Soviet connection
was also stressed by the government’s Russia Committee: “The Soviet Lega-
tion at Bangkok was clearly designed to be the centre of Soviet activity in the
whole of South East Asia and Soviet couriers passing through Singapore en
route for the Far East or Australia were a constant source of danger.”23 One of
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18. “Review of the Emergency in Malaya,” p. 3, 1968/4248, A452/2, NAA. This document was
made available to the Australian prime minister’s department by the British High Commission in July
1967 for a meeting concerning defense and security arrangements in the South Paciªc; it was
declassiªed in 1998.
19. Parliamentary Debates, 23 July 1948, 5th Ser. Vol. 454 (1948), p. 787. Only the Communist MP,
Willie Gallacher, challenged this assessment as “a foul slander” and “an attack on the Malayan working
class.” House of Commons Debates, 23 July 1948, 5th Ser., Vol. 454 (1948), p. 790. On the role of
Creech Jones, see Kenneth O. Morgan, “Imperialists at Bay: British Labour and Decolonization,”
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 27, No. 2 (May 1999), p. 236.
20.  “Communist Activities in the Colonies: Fortnightly Reports,” 1948, CO 537/2638, NAUK.
21. “The United Kingdom in South-East Asia and the Far East,” 27 October 1949, CAB 129/37/1,
NAUK.
22. Tilman Remme, Britain and Regional Cooperation in South-East Asia, 1945–49 (London:
Routledge, 1995), p. 133.
23. Minutes of Meeting, Russia Committee, 14 October 1948 (Top Secret), FO 1110/33, NAUK.
Similarly Lt. General Briggs believed that “the roots [of the uprising] may well lie outside Malaya, in
these “couriers” was L.L. Sharkey, the general secretary of the Communist
Party of Australia (CPA). After attending the Calcutta conferences,24 Sharkey
traveled to Singapore and, according to the Russia Committee, “played a con-
siderable part in persuading the Malayan Communists to adopt a policy of vi-
olence.”25 Evidence to substantiate this allegation comes from Chin Peng,
who recently wrote that “Sharkey’s words [that in Australia, strike-breakers
were murdered] had inspired us to the point that, as the meeting progressed
to its ªnal stages, there emerged total commitment among those present for a
toughening of our policy towards strikebreakers.”26
The link between the September 1947 inaugural conference of the
Cominform, which postulated the “two camp” thesis, the Calcutta meetings,
and “the marked increase in Communist activity in South-East Asia immedi-
ately afterwards” was also endorsed by the South-East Asia Department of the
Foreign Ofªce.27 A top-secret joint memorandum submitted to the Cabinet
defence committee by the minister of defence and the secretary of state for
war located the Malayan Emergency in a wider context, arguing that strong
armed action “against the guerrillas in Malaya is a vital step in the ‘cold war’
against Communism in the Far East. The Malayan campaign is not isolated
and must be considered in relation to the Far East theatre as a whole.”28 Brit-
ain’s chief intelligence ofªcer in Malaya, Major Harry Fisher, stretched the
geographical context to include Europe. In a conversation with the U.S. con-
sul in Kuala Lumpur, he suggested that the terrorist campaign “was merely
one phase of a war which would soon break out in Europe over the Berlin sit-
uation.”29 The U.S. consul also reported that the Chief Secretary of Malaya,
Sir Alexander Newboult, subscribed to the “rather widely held belief that
Moscow is making a push in the East now that she seemed to be stopped tem-
porarily in Europe.”30 Creech Jones expressed a similar view. “Once the path
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Russia in particular.” Statement by Sir Harold Briggs, 20 April 1950, CAB 104/263, NAUK. Briggs
was appointed “Director of anti-Bandit Operations” in Malaya in March 1950. He arrived in Kuala
Lumpur on 3 April 1950.
24. Two Calcutta conferences took place. The ªrst, organized by the World Federation of Democratic
Youth and the International Union of Students on 19–25 February 1948, was attended by the MCP
delegate, who did not take part in the second conference, organized by the Congress of the Indian
Communist Party on 28 February–6 March. Sharkey attended both.
25. Minutes of Meeting, Russia Committee, 14 October 1948, FO 1110/33, NAUK.
26. Chin Peng (pseud.], My Side of History (Singapore: Media Masters, 2003), pp. 204–205.
27. “Outline of Communist Strategy in South-East Asia,” 15 August 1949, FO 1110/189 (PR 2887/
11/913), NAUK.
28. “Present Situation in Malaya,” Background Paper for Defence Committee, 24 October 1950
(Top Secret), DO (50)92, CAB 21/1682, NAUK.
29. Blue to Acheson, 24 October 1948, 846E.00/10–2448, RG 59, NARA.
30. “Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 10 Dated June 28, 1948,” Conªdential Memorandum, 23
June 1948, 846E.00/10–2848, RG 59, NARA.
of the Communists was blocked in Europe,” he wrote, “there would be a very
concerted effort in the East.”31 This was consistent with the prevailing belief
that “Western consolidation in Europe under the Marshall Plan was forcing
the Kremlin to search for new opportunities for expansion in Southeast
Asia.”32 Hence, British ofªcials at the time believed that success in Malaya
would be “a vital step in the ‘Cold War’ against communism in the Far
East.”33 The Cold War framework shaped their understanding of and re-
sponse to the Malayan insurgency.
Such assessments were not conªned to private discussions, closed com-
mittee meetings, and top-secret memoranda. Residents of Malaya who owned
radios were able to hear similar views expressed, albeit in a more extreme
form, during a lengthy broadcast over Radio Malaya on the evening of 7 July
1948 titled “The Conºict in Malaya.”34 The language used during the broad-
cast by the recently appointed UK commissioner-general in Southeast Asia,
Malcolm MacDonald, was often lurid, vitriolic, and morally charged, akin to
the rhetoric then emanating from the Committee on Un-American Activities
of the U.S. House of Representatives.35 “It is the Communists,” MacDonald
declared, “who are now trying to impose upon you a vicious, tyrannical
rule. . . . Our action will not cease until their wicked movement has been ut-
terly destroyed.” The aim of the Communists, he said, was “to establish gang-
ster rule in Malaya,” and therefore the British government would have to
combat the MCP “until their power has been broken and they themselves are
exterminated.”36 Only then would there be “safety for your homes.” The “ter-
rorist outbreak,” according to MacDonald, “is part of a deliberate plan by the
Malayan Communists to stage a violent revolution and capture the govern-
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31. Report No. 15, 22 June 1948, CO 717/172/52849/9/1948, NAUK.
32. Sean Greenwood, Britain and the Cold War, 1945–1991 (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 79.
33. Memorandum by Minister of Defence and Secretary of State for War, 24 October 1950,
DO(50)92, Pt. 2, PREM 8/1406, NAUK.
34. Text transmitted to Department of State, 9 July 1948, 846E.00/7–948, RG 59, NARA. MacDon-
ald, the son of former Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, had been a British MP since 1929. From
1935 to 1948 he had served as Secretary of State for the Colonies, Minister of Health, UK High Com-
missioner in Canada, Governor-General of the Malayan Union, and Governor-General of Malaya,
Singapore, and British Borneo. His views were authoritative and respected. According to one writer,
he was “one of the most inºuential and persuasive diplomats that Britain had ever sent to Malaya.”
J. P. Ongkili, Nation-Building in Malaysia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 82. Indeed,
some have argued that British policy on Malaya was inºuenced primarily by MacDonald’s conviction
that external pressures (whether China or the Soviet Union) had determined the MCP’s action. See
Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, The Left Wing in Southeast Asia (New York: William Sloan,
1950), p. 154.
35. See Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon, eds., The Cold War: A History through Documents
(Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1999), pp. 61–62; and Stephen J. Whitªeld, The Culture of
the Cold War (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991), ch. 5.
36. Similarly, Creech Jones referred to the need to “liquidate the guerrilla bands.” “The Situation in
Malaya,” 1 July 1948, CP(48) 171, CAB 129/28, NAUK .
ment of this country. That is a sober statement of fact.” The broadcast was in-
tended simultaneously to alert the populace to the gravity of the threat and—
by exhaustively outlining the harsh countermeasures that had been taken or
were planned—to fortify and reassure listeners. Among those listening was
the U.S. consul general in Singapore, Paul Josselyn, who told his superiors in
Washington: “Do not consider MacDonald’s accusation and warning exagger-
ated . . . public has frank statement difªculties confronting govt [sic] and its
determination to suppress disorder.”37
Besides the desire to resist Communist expansion at the outset of the
Cold War, another reason for Britain’s decision to undertake a large military
commitment at a time of ªscal pressures and resource constraints was the eco-
nomic potential of the region. Once the Japanese were defeated in 1945, the
British were determined to return to Malaya. This second colonial occupation
occurred because of Malaya’s dollar-earning capacity. As Creech Jones told the
Cabinet (but not Parliament):
During 1947 the total value of the exports of Singapore and the [Malayan] Fed-
eration together was £151 million of which dollar exports accounted for £56
million. [Malaya] is by far the most important source of dollars in the colonial em-
pire and it would gravely worsen the whole dollar balance of the Sterling Area if
there were serious interference with Malayan exports.38
In 1948 the United States imported 727,000 tons of rubber, more than half
of which came from Malaya. Of the 158,000 tons of tin imported by the
United States, all but 3,000 came from Malaya. Measured in U.S. dollars,
rubber shipments from Malaya exceeded in total value all domestic exports
from Britain to the United States. From 1946 to 1950, Britain earned $700
million from rubber exports to the United States.39 Any interruption of that
supply by the insurgency would seriously impair the British economy. In
1948, Britain was still struggling to maintain the value of its currency, and the
“dollar gap” seemed to be getting wider. This ªnancial crisis made earnings
from the “Sterling Area,” in which Malaya was the linchpin, all the more
crucial. The security of British business in Malaya was therefore of central
economic importance.40 This economic motivation was not publicly empha-
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37. Josselyn to Acheson, 10 July 1948, 846E.00/7–948, RG 59, NARA.
38. Cabinet Memorandum, 1 July 1948, CP(48) 171, CAB 129/28, NAUK (emphasis added).
39. Richard Stubbs, Counter-Insurgency and the Economic Factor: The Impact of the Korean War Prices
Boom on the Malayan Emergency, Occasional Paper No. 19 (Singapore: Institute of South East Asian
Studies, 1974), p. 3. Malaya accounted for one-third of the world’s total output of natural rubber,
more than half of total output of ªrst-grade rubber, and one-third of total output of tin.
40. According to Nicholas White, the insurgency was “fully recognised as a threat to British business,”
and the government tried to restore and maintain business conªdence “to the extent that there was no
mass exodus of British capital from Malaya.” Nicholas J. White, Business, Government, and the End of
sized, for to have done so would have permitted it to be exploited by the Brit-
ish Communist newspaper The Daily Worker as well as provide ammunition
to the more ardent anti-imperialist “Keep Left” faction within the British
Labour Party.
Retrospective Assessments
The “Communist plot” thesis, usually with its Cold War garb, became
the prevalent interpretation of the Malayan Emergency. The view that, at the
Calcutta conference in February 1948, leaders of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU) transmitted to the MCP a directive to take up arms is,
according to Yeo Kim Wah, “the orthodox view and by far the most widely ac-
cepted version of the communist uprising in Malaya.”41 In most respects this
is correct. Not surprisingly, historians writing during the early Cold War years
fell overwhelmingly into this category. Ian Morrison, Virginia Thompson and
Richard Adloff, Philip Mosley, Victor Purcell, M. R. Masani, Harry Miller,
Lucian Pye, J. H. Brimmell, and Alex Josey all subscribe to the “orthodox”
view.42 This interpretation took root and foreshadowed the more recent histo-
riography of the Malayan Emergency. For example, in a book published in the
early 1990s, Robert Jackson claims that at Calcutta the MCP delegation “re-
ceived fresh instructions from Moscow” that “ordered [the MCP and other
Southeast Asian Communist parties] to go on the offensive” and launch a
“carefully orchestrated” insurrection. Reiterating the traditional Cold War–
inspired view, Jackson argues that the Soviet Union’s intention was to divert
Britain’s attention and military resources from Europe to Asia and thereby
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Empire (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 123. See also “Malaya and the Sterling Area,”
26 April 1950, Paper No. 5, CO 537/6089, NAUK.
41. Anthony Short, “Correspondence,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (September
1970), p. 155.
42. See Ian Morrison, “The Communist Uprising in Malaya,” Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 17, No. 24
(December 1948), pp. 281–286; Thompson and Adloff, The Left Wing in Southeast Asia, p. 155;
Philip E. Mosley, “Soviet Policy and Revolutions in Asia,” Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science, No. 276 (July 1951), p. 96; Victor Purcell, Malaya: Communist or Free? (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 1954), p. 132; M. R. Masani, The Communist Party of India: A Short
History (New York: Macmillan, 1954), pp. 89–90; Harry Miller, The Communist Menace in Malaya
(New York: Praeger, 1955), p. 76; J. H. Brimmell, Malayan Communist Party: A Short History (Singa-
pore: Donald Moore, 1956), pp. 19–20; Lucian W. Pye, Guerilla Communism in Malaya: Its Social
and Political Meaning (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 84; and Alex Josey, Trade
Unionism in Malaya (Singapore: Donald Moore, 1958), p. 21. See also the intriguing 43-page booklet
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facilitate “a major [Soviet] political offensive in Europe,” particularly in the
Balkans, Berlin, and Italy.43 Donald Mackay concurs, arguing that after the
Berlin airlift began in June 1948 the Soviet leader, Josif Stalin, was “in urgent
need of some diversionary activity to deºect the attention of the Western
powers.” Consequently, the Soviet Union—the “Almer Mater of international
revolution,” as Mackay puts it—sent a “ªery cross” around the region with
which it “set South East Asia alight.”44
Less evocatively, Frank Trager concludes that Calcutta was “the signal for
the post-war re-entry of the Soviet Union into South and Southeast Asia,”
and Brian Crozier contends that all of the Southeast Asian insurrections of
1948 were “part of a pre-determined plan worked out in Moscow and Cal-
cutta.”45 Richard Clutterbuck implies that the Calcutta conference is what
sparked “armed revolution throughout Southeast Asia” and the “outbreak of
rioting, sabotage and assassination in Malaya.”46 Robert Thompson expresses
even greater certainty about this point: “In the case of Malaya, it is now
known that instructions were received from Moscow” at Calcutta. The MCP,
he maintains, “was a well-placed pawn which Russia could not fail to use, and
if necessary sacriªce, in the cold-war period.”47 Other writers, who agree that
MCP strategy was shaped by the international Communist movement, have
maintained, albeit with little evidence, that the Chinese Communist Party,
not the CPSU, was the driving force.48 However, even the U.S. State Depart-
ment at the time rejected this view.49 Privately, several British ofªcials (though
39
Malaya, 1948: Britain’s Asian Cold War?
43. Robert Jackson, The Malayan Emergency: The Commonwealth’s Wars 1948–1966 (London:
Routledge, 1991), pp. 12–13.
44. Donald Mackay, The Malayan Emergency 1948–60: The Domino That Stood Still (London:
Brassey’s, 1997), p. 29. The Berlin airlift in fact did not begin until 24 June, after the Malayan Emer-
gency commenced.
45. Frank N. Trager, Marxism in Southeast Asia: A Study of Four Countries (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1965), p. 268; and Brian Crozier, Southeast Asia in Turmoil (Middlesex, UK: Pen-
guin, 1965), p. 64, echoing the judgment in his earlier book, The Rebels: A Study of Post-War Insurrec-
tions (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 148.
46. Richard. L. Clutterbuck, The Long Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam (New
York: Praeger, 1966), p. 185. See also Richard Clutterbuck, Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Ma-
laya 1945–1963 (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), p. 56.
47. Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New
York: Praeger, 1966), p. 28. O’Ballance is less monocausal than Thompson; he attributes the MCP re-
volt to a “number of combined factors” but still believes that the Calcutta conference was the “main
consideration.” Edgar O’Ballance, Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948–60 (London: Faber
and Faber, 1966), pp. 76–77.
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not the Secretary of State for War, Emanuel Shinwell), were also skeptical, as
A. J. Stockwell has found.50
The MCP in the Post-1945 Era
The notion that Soviet instructions, transmitted in Calcutta, provoked armed
uprisings in several Southeast Asian countries is questionable. As with many
allegations of Communist plots, tangible evidence for this view (as opposed to
the mere appearance of cause and effect), is extremely thin. A different inter-
pretation of the origins of the Malayan Emergency emerges when we take ac-
count of the history of the MCP and the postwar conditions in Malaya.
Immigrant members of a leftwing faction of the Chinese Nationalists
(the Guomindang) introduced Communism into Malaya in the 1920s.51 Af-
ter the expulsion of Communists from the Chinese mainland in 1927 and the
abortive attempt by the Communist International’s Far Eastern Bureau in
Shanghai to establish the Nanyang (South Seas) Communist Party, the MCP
was formed in Singapore in early 1930. In the mid-1930s the party reorga-
nized and gained control of sections of the labor movement, including its
spearhead, the Malayan General Labour Union. Once the Sino-Japanese war
began in 1937, the MCP formed an “anti-Japanese” united front within the
Chinese community and established new cells in both urban and rural areas.
Even so, the party lacked a mass base, and its support never extended into the
predominant Malay population.52 Following the Japanese invasion of Malaya
in 1942, the MCP established the Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army
(MPAJA) and began to receive arms, ammunition, and guerrilla training from
the British.53 The MCP set up a military wing that gained valuable experience
in guerrilla ªghting—a wing that was revived in 1948. The MCP emerged
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from the war stronger and with greater support, tarnished only by the savage
justice meted out by the MPAJA to alleged collaborators and traitors after pe-
remptory mass “trials.” At the end of the war, the 23-year-old Chin Peng, who
headed the illegal MCP during the entire period of the emergency, marched
in a victory parade in Singapore and was awarded the prestigious Order of the
British Empire.54
When the British returned to Malaya in late 1945, the MCP yielded. Un-
der the authoritative and charismatic leadership of the Vietnamese-born gen-
eral secretary, Lai Tek (also known by his peculiar alias “Mr. Wright”), the
party did not follow the example of the Vietminh and the Indonesian Com-
munists in waging an anti-colonial armed struggle. Instead, the MCP cooper-
ated with the British Military Administration, relinquished its arms, dis-
banded the MPAJA (each member, once demobilized, received 350 Malayan
dollars and a bag of rice),55 and supported a united-front strategy of open pol-
itics and covert permeation. During the ªrst eighteen months after the British
reoccupation, the MCP focused on strengthening its prewar role in the trade
union movement. By 1947 it controlled, through the Pan-Malayan Federa-
tion of Trade Unions, 214 of the 277 registered unions.56 This hard-won suc-
cess became pyrrhic when the leadership of the party disintegrated. This in-
ternal crisis was a central reason for the MCP’s decision to abandon peaceful
agitation in favor of armed struggle.
On 3 March 1947, on the eve of a specially convened MCP Central
Committee meeting, Lai Tek disappeared and was never seen again.57 He took
with him not only his vast knowledge of the MCP’s infrastructure but also the
bulk of the party’s considerable funds.58 Evidence later emerged that he had
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been a triple agent working for the British Special Branch in Singapore both
before and after World War II and collaborating with the Japanese Kempeitai
intelligence service during the war.59 His betrayal seriously compromised the
MCP. The information he supplied led, for example, to the “Batu Caves mas-
sacre” in September 1942, when a large number of senior party members were
captured and beheaded by the Japanese. The information turned over by Lai
Tek also resulted in the capture of large supply and ammunition dumps by the
Selangor police in February 1947, just weeks before his defection.60
Although Chin Peng immediately assumed leadership of the MCP, the
fallout from the Lai Tek affair was enormous. The party took at least twelve
months to recover.61 The paralysis of the MCP during this period has been
documented by others and will not be detailed here.62 What is important, for
this article, is that after the MCP rank-and-ªle learned about Lai Tek’s defec-
tion, Chin Peng came under strong pressure to repudiate the policies of his
discredited patron. These policies, as noted earlier, had been moderate: Lai
Tek was the architect of postwar cooperation with the British and peaceful
penetration of student and worker organizations. “But for him,” noted a Brit-
ish intelligence report in 1948, “an attempt would have been made in 1945 or
1946 to organise a more militant campaign by the Communists.”63 His pres-
ence had been a powerful barrier to aggressive militancy. Moreover, Lai Tek’s
removal of actual or potential rivals, combined with the information he
turned over in his role as triple agent, resulted in the elimination of Commu-
nist leaders in the all-important party center in Singapore. The leadership
structure in the wake of his defection was characterized by youth, inexperi-
ence, and a lack of discipline. The more radical middle-level cadres, who had
taken part in the wartime resistance and were committed to the ideals of the
MPAJA, were in the ascendance. Their demands to resort to violent insurrec-
tion found increasingly receptive ears within the MCP hierarchy. All of this
was at least six months before the Calcutta conferences.
Another purely internal factor—the interplay between labor unrest and
colonial repression—also contributed to the MCP’s adoption of a more mili-
tant posture. Although labor-industrial relations in postwar Malaya were
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highly complex and varied by class, race, and region, certain patterns can be
discerned.64 First, the old-style paternalism of the interwar years had dissi-
pated. One of the most regulated labor regimes in the British Empire had
been abruptly dismantled in 1942. The immediate postwar period, when the
labor market was in disarray, found a workforce less compliant and more in-
dependent. Chinese contract workers, who were less bonded to their employ-
ers and more mobile, were no longer willing to tolerate exorbitant charges for
the necessities of life. Employers bristled at this erosion of labor control,
which gave rise to rebelliousness and the rapid growth of unionism.
Second, the popularity, resources, and scale of the General Labour Un-
ion, renamed the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU) in late
1946, were—by prewar standards—immense. The activities of the PMFTU
were wide-ranging (sponsoring schools, overseeing small businesses, conduct-
ing industrial negotiations) and its membership base diverse (itinerant work-
ers, rickshaw drivers, small-scale vendors, contracting gangs, craft guilds, and
others). By April 1947, PMFTU membership was 263,598, or more than
50 percent of the total workforce. The union was legal, constitutional, and
militant—and it was controlled by the MCP.65 In April 1946 the government
of the Malayan Union, anxious to restore stability to a restless workforce and
an unsettled economy but also hoping to break centralized Communist con-
trol of the trade union movement, introduced the Trade Unions Ordinance
requiring the supervision and registration of all trade unions. This restrictive
policy remained in force until early 1948 and was the prelude to the end of
the PMFTU. Although the PMFTU had organized a successful general strike
on 29–30 January 1946, it backed away from open conºict in the face of Brit-
ain’s superior strength and resolve. Undoubtedly, the “moderate” hand of Lai
Tek also played a role. But some MCP activists were dissatisªed with the un-
ion’s lack of revolutionary fervor, and their frustration was compounded by
the leadership crisis of March 1947 when a strike wave was engulªng the
country. In the twelve months from April 1947, 512,000 workdays were lost
in Malaya and 205,000 in Singapore.66 Many were wildcat strikes initiated
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without ofªcial authorization, and they ebbed and ºowed with ºuctuations in
the labor market. The sources of this industrial unrest were complex and need
not concern us here. Sufªce it to say that the strike wave was symptomatic of
pressure from below that both emboldened and propelled the MCP to adopt
a more militant, revolutionary stance.
Third, the response of employers was unyielding and their actions draco-
nian. They rued the erosion of their paternalistic “rights” over the workforce
and feared the growing power of the Communist-dominated union move-
ment. To bolster productivity and proªt margins during a difªcult period of
postwar reconstruction, they were intent on restoring stability and order.
Their crackdown on labor organizations was assisted—cautiously and per-
functorily in 1945–1946 and more earnestly in 1947–1948—by the colonial
administration. The interests of state and business coincided insofar as each
was committed to restoring business conªdence and curbing the politi-
cization of industrial unrest.67 Prior to the outbreak of the Malayan Emer-
gency, the employers took the lead in attempting to reimpose discipline. They
formed new associations such as the Malayan Planting Industry Employers’
Association and the Malayan Mining Employers’ Association, the former of
which recommended ºogging, banishment, and even execution for “vicious
malcontents,” “agitators,” and other “subversive elements” who masqueraded
as adherents of a “utopian political faith.”68 As the price of rubber dropped in
the winter of 1947, the employers dismissed workers and used eviction orders
to expel labor activists from their plantations. In mid-1947, during strikes in
Kedah sparked by a substantial wage cut, the planters insisted that they would
negotiate only with contractors, not with unions. Some introduced their own
employment regulations that severely circumscribed union activity. Many em-
ployers dismissed union “agitators” and replaced them with non-unionized
“scab” workers. The union activists, for their part, engaged in ruthless picket
action and violent intimidation of strikebreakers. They threatened the lives of
managers and occasionally made good on their threats, prompting managers
to evacuate their families to Penang. For many Britons, the terror was actual
as well as implied. Militant activity, inºamed by evictions and growing unem-
ployment, was especially evident in the Sungei Siput area in Perak. It was here
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in June 1948 that the murders of three rubber plantation managers triggered
the State of Emergency.69
The insurrection in Malaya needs to be seen within this broader domestic
context. Three factors were especially important: an unyielding, repressive,
and more uniªed body of estate and mine owners increasingly assisted by lo-
cal authorities, security forces, and police; a less malleable, more militant, and
better organized but still restless workforce; and endemic anxiety and violence
on the rural frontier.70 The MCP was aware of the ªrst factor, was inºuenced
by the second, and saw opportunities in the third. From early 1947 on these
factors converged, and in May–June 1948 they collided. Although the MCP
fell into disarray in the aftermath of the Lai Tek affair, the new leaders of the
party were poised to rekindle revolutionary fervor. The MCP was losing its
grassroots support in urban areas largely because of the assault on its key
“front” organizations by the colonial government, which was taking tough ac-
tion to curb unrest and restore stability.71 The party’s strength in rural areas,
amid pervasive rivalries and conºicts between individual estate unions, was
limited and undependable.72 The MCP therefore embarked on a revolt for
which it was ill-prepared. But its options were few—either jail or the jungle.
None of these developments was determined by factors external to Malaya,
contrary to the still-widespread view that the revolt occurred only because the
MCP received Soviet “instructions” to that effect at the Calcutta conferences
of February–March 1948. The international dimension of the crisis is the
subject to which we now turn.
Cominform, Calcutta, and Sharkey
Although it is an overstatement to say that the MCP had “little, if any,
connexion with the outside world,”73 the party had always been on the mar-
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gins of the international Communist movement. The records of the Commu-
nist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), especially its Political Committee and Ex-
ecutive Committee, contain only ºeeting references to “The Situation in
Malaya”—a surprising gap in light of Malaya’s importance to the British em-
pire.74 The paucity of the MCP’s links with other Communist parties also was
evident in the discussions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of Australia (CPA), a party more geographically proximate.75
Nonetheless, despite the MCP’s comparative isolation, Malayan Com-
munists undoubtedly were aware of the highly publicized keynote speech by
Andrei Zhdanov, a leading Soviet ofªcial, to the inaugural conference of the
Cominform in the Polish town of Szklarska Poremba in September 1947.76
The most famous aspect of his report was that the world was divided into
“two camps”—a peace-loving, progressive camp led by the Soviet Union and a
war-mongering, imperialist camp led by the United States.77 Zhdanov had
Europe, not Asia, in his sights. Because he was seeking to give the “required ri-
gidity to the future structure of the Soviet sphere of inºuence in Eastern Eu-
rope;” his speech said much about Yugoslavia and little about the colonies in
Asia and Africa.78 Even so, the speech marked the beginning of an aggressive,
militant line faithfully adopted by the world’s Communist parties. This new
approach, reminiscent of the Comintern’s “class-against-class” offensive in
1929–1932, lasted until the early 1950s; it was doctrinaire in analysis, unreal-
istic in expectations, self-delusory and, ultimately, self-defeating. It also
formed part of the backdrop to Calcutta.
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The extent to which the two Calcutta conferences acted as transmission
belts of the Cominform “two camp” doctrine to Southeast Asia is hard to de-
termine with any precision. Undoubtedly the new militant line was promoted
for the region. Colonial regimes backed by the French, Dutch, and British
were slotted into the pro-imperialist camp; the united front was jettisoned;
and “neutral” nationalism and all forms of class cooperation were denounced.
The conference stipulated that anti-colonial struggles must be led exclusively
by Communists. Only the ªrst conference—the one organized jointly by the
World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Stu-
dents—was attended by a Malayan delegate, the relatively junior Li Siong,
who was president of the Malayan New Democratic Youth League, an MCP
front organization.79 Apparently, he was chosen because of his good command
of English, but he was an ineffective intermediary for the Cominform. He did
not arrive back in Singapore until 22 March 1948, well after the crucial 4th
Plenum of the MCP.80 In the only systematic analysis of the ªrst Calcutta con-
ference, Ruth McVey argues that
the main point made by the conference—that there could be no compromise in
the struggle against imperialism—could have led easily to the conclusion that
the only remaining path was that of armed struggle. . . . [T]he militant tone dis-
played by the Calcutta Conference may well have given encouragement and
added prestige to the more extreme elements among the Southeast Asian Com-
munists. Later . . . they could look on the conference’s declarations as an ideo-
logical justiªcation for their decisions to try the way of violence.81
The conclusions drawn by the MCP and the justiªcations provided by the
conference must, however, be delineated from causal connections. Despite the
near simultaneity and alleged synchronicity of rebellions in Burma, Malaya,
Indonesia, and the Philippines, the impact of Calcutta was far from uniform.
The conference had its greatest impact on the Burmese delegates and the least
effect on the “most unsympathetic,” non-Communist Filipino delegation.82
McVey emphasizes the absence of any documentary evidence of the promul-
gation or passing of secret instructions at the conference, the unsuitability
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of such a broad-based conference for the transmission of highly conªdential
directives, and the existence of internal conditions that had already stoked
rebellious inclinations within the Southeast Asian Communist parties. She
concludes:
The opportunity and incentive for Communist rebellion were already present in
the countries where revolt occurred. It thus does not seem likely that the two-
camp message lit the revolutionary spark in Southeast Asia, though it may well
have added extra tinder which caused it to burn into ºame.83
In relation to Malaya, therefore, it would appear that by March 1948 the
MCP was cognizant of, and perhaps fortiªed by, the Zhdanov line and the
revolutionary ªres burning in neighboring countries, especially China and
Indochina. But there is little evidence that the MCP’s strategy was dictated by
the CPSU or that—as Brimmell alleges—”Moscow’s instructions were
adopted.”84 Rather, a conjunction emerged between international trends and
domestic pressures. The lessons from outside were consistent with develop-
ments inside Malaya.
What about the role of Lance Sharkey, the general secretary of the Austra-
lian Communist Party, who is presumed to have been a Soviet emissary? Once
again there is no extant documentary evidence regarding the secret discussions
Sharkey held with the leaders of the MCP during his two-week “stopover” in
Singapore on his way home to Sydney after attending both Calcutta confer-
ences.85 Certainly Sharkey, far more than his counterpart in London, Harry
Pollitt, found the tough, doctrinaire line very congenial.86 He was a dedicated
Stalinist who had been trained in Moscow and installed by the Comintern as
leader of the CPA in 1929. In that capacity, he carried immense authority.87
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85. However, one former Communist and member of the CPA Victorian State Executive, Cecil
Sharpley, wrote, “Sharkey told us, too, how he had been commissioned by the Cominform representa-
tives at the Indian Congress to convey decisions to the Malayan Communists.” Cecil Sharpley, The
Great Delusion: The Autobiography of an Ex-Communist Leader (London: William Heinemann, 1952),
p. 111. Unfortunately, though, Sharpley’s book is highly unreliable and is full of errors and inconsis-
tencies. See his I Was a Communist Leader (Melbourne: Herald and Weekly Times, 1949). He defected
from the CPA in April 1949, sold his “revelations” to The Melbourne Herald, precipitated the estab-
lishment of a Royal Commission into Communism (1949–1950)—which largely exonerated the
party of his allegations—and worked closely with the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation,
one of whose ofªcers ghostwrote Sharpley’s autobiography. See “Communism in Australia,” E. J. Wil-
liams, UK High Commissioner in Australia, to Foreign Ofªce, 29 November 1949, FO 1110/211,
NAUK.
86. Relations between the CPA and CPGB were acrimonious from the beginning of 1948. The CPGB
was publicly attacked by the CPA Secretariat for its “right wing deviationism” and class collaboration.
See World News and Views, 7 August 1948, pp. 332–334.
87. See Stuart Macintyre, The Communist Party of Australia: From Origins to Illegality (Sydney: Allen
and Unwin, 1999), pp. 169, 286. Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, p. 60, incorrectly describes Sharkey as
But ideological support and verbal encouragement of anti-colonial struggle
are not the same as carrying instructions “on behalf of Stalin.”88 Although
Chin Peng may not be a reliable source, his reminiscences in 1999—some
ªfty years after the events—underscore the need for caution in weighing the
role of Sharkey. Chin Peng acknowledged that Sharkey inºuenced the MCP’s
tactics and that the Australian’s visit was “inspiring,” but he insisted unequiv-
ocally that Sharkey did not determine the MCP’s strategy.89 The inference one
might draw is that Sharkey gave advice, clariªcation, and his imprimatur but
left the question of a Malayan uprising to local decision.90 If so, one of the
central props of the traditional interpretation—the notion that the MCP was
ordered into the jungle as part of an Asian revolutionary strategy developed in
Moscow, set in motion at Calcutta, and dictated by Sharkey in Singapore—
collapses.
Countdown to Insurrection?
Even allowing for the absence of external direction in the events of mid-1948,
did a clearly formulated plan for revolt exist? Were the murders at Sungei
Siput part of this plan? Did the MCP decide on insurrection at some point?
The received wisdom suggests that the MCP did indeed plan the action well
in advance. Gene Hanrahan asserts that once the “strategic doctrines and tac-
tical directives [were] laid out,” MCP leaders launched “their plan of chaos.”91
Lucian Pye refers to “a coordinated plan”; Edgar O’Ballance to a “mapped out
programme”; Harry Miller to a “blueprint for victory”; J. H. Brimmell to a
“fateful decision”; Charles McLane to a “plan of struggle”; Richard
Clutterbuck to “launching the armed struggle”; Robert Jackson to a “carefully
orchestrated” offensive; and Victor Purcell to “central planning and direction”
by “a Central Bureau in close touch with the Central Executive Commit-
tee.”92 These judgments were consistent with Malcolm MacDonald’s “sober
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“voluble.” See Macintyre, The Communist Party of Australia, p. 361, for a description of Sharkey’s
“leaden” oratory.
88. De Cruz, “Correspondence,” p. 125. De Cruz, a high-ranking member of the MCP, later an apos-
tate, incorrectly calls Sharkey “Len” but recalls him “dotting the i’s and crossing the t’s of the decisions
arrived at by the [Calcutta] Conference.”
89. Peng stated this at a two-day conference at the Australian National University in Canberra on 22–
23 February 1999 (see the coverage in The Australian, 15 March 1999, p. 13) and repeated it in his au-
tobiography, My Side of History, pp. 202–205.
90. This is supported by Thompson and Adloff, The Left Wing in Southeast Asia, p. 154. Sharkey
made no secret of his long-standing interest in Malaya. See, for example, his preface in Walter
Blaschke, Freedom for Malaya (Sydney: Current Book Distributors, 1947), p. 2.
91. Hanrahan, The Communist Struggle in Malaya, p. 65.
92. Pye, Guerilla Communism in Malaya, p. 84; O’Ballance, Malaya, p. 76; Miller, Jungle War in Ma-
statement of fact” that the “present terrorist outbreak” was “part of a deliber-
ate plan” to stage revolution and capture government.93 Thus, with only a few
exceptions, the accepted interpretation in Malayan Emergency historiography
assumes centralized planning and coordinated decision-making.94 Interest-
ingly, one of the few observers in Malaya itself, who was more circumspect
than those to whom he spoke, was the U.S. consul, William Blue. Separating
conjecture from conªrmation, he wrote that he had “as yet seen no documen-
tary proof that the present campaign against the Government is ‘Communist-
inspired’ as the [British] authorities describe it.”95
The “documentary proof” cited in the literature on the Malayan Emer-
gency is usually the three resolutions of the 4th Plenum of the MCP Central
Committee, which met in Singapore from 17 to 21 March 1948. Sharkey was
among those who spoke at the plenum. One of the resolutions adopted at the
plenum emphasized the need to restore party discipline in the wake of the Lai
Tek defection. The two other resolutions were more fundamental. One stated
that the ªght for independence from British imperialism must ultimately take
the form of a “people’s revolutionary war,” and the other called on “the
masses” to prepare themselves for “an uncompromising struggle for independ-
ence without regard to considerations of legality.”96 The resolutions were
about intentions. They emphasized the need to prepare for a rebellion. The
militancy of the 4th Plenum was less a turning point than a benchmark along
a path on which the MCP had been moving since 1947.97 Clarity, discipline,
and coordination, as well as an explicit revolutionary program—normally the
sine qua non of successful insurrection—were absent. In retrospect, it appears
that the MCP anticipated a lengthy period of increasingly combative activity
in which both legal and illegal tactics would be employed. The ruthlessness of
the British response—ªrst in outlawing the all-important PMFTU, then in
introducing the draconian State of Emergency regulations—was unexpected.
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Purcell, Malaya, p. 132.
93. Text Transmitted to U.S. Department of State, 9 July 1948, 846E.00/7–948, RG 59, NARA. See
also “Note on the Situation in Malaya,” 23 February 1955, p. 1, 371/116939, NAUK, for a similar
viewpoint.
94. Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, p. 61; and Stockwell, “A Widespread and Long-Concocted Plot,”
pp. 66–88.
95. “Progress Made in Campaign against Terrorism in the Federation,” Conªdential Dispatch No.
44, Blue to Acheson, 24 October 1948, p. 3, 846E.00/10–2448, RG 59, NARA.
96. McLane, Soviet Strategies, p. 386, drawing on unpublished translations of the 4th Plenum docu-
ments.
97. The rapidly ascendant militant wing and the increasingly restless rank-and-ªle had become disillu-
sioned with the united-front strategy. By 1948 the MCP leaders who were wary of armed struggle had
been marginalized.
The timing of the State of Emergency clearly took the MCP by surprise.98
Consequently, the party’s decision to go underground was ad hoc; its retreat
to the jungles was made in panic; and its switch from urban to rural revolt was
confused. These moves left the MCP’s “front” organizations off balance, lead-
erless, and isolated. In this sense, the decision to mobilize for guerrilla warfare
was accelerated by, and partly in response to, the severity of government ac-
tion in May–June 1948. The notion that the MCP was following a carefully
planned strategy—a strategy coordinated by a highly centralized party struc-
ture—is fallacious. By all indications, the murders of the three European
planters at Sungei Siput on 16 June were not authorized or sanctioned by
MCP leaders but carried out instead by a local Communist guerrilla unit act-
ing on its own initiative.99
The inchoate nature of the insurgency was conªrmed by Malcolm Mac-
Donald, who had been perhaps the strongest and most persuasive voice be-
hind the British Cabinet’s decision in July 1948 to outlaw the MCP. On
14 October, he briefed a top-secret meeting in London of the government’s
Russia Committee. His assessment, unintentionally, casts doubt on en-
trenched historical judgments and provides a revealing look at the MCP’s
weaknesses. He stated that the Malayan Communists
had failed because they had not been extreme enough. Murder on a larger scale
and sabotage of railways, mines and broadcasting stations might have been very
successful. . . . [But] the Communists were, in fact, amateurs drawn from the
ranks of unskilled Chinese bandits (not Moscow-trained revolutionaries) and
had not possessed the determination required to carry out such an ambitious
plan. . . . They had never been able to set up a central control of the insurrec-
tion. . . . [A]rms and ammunition were running short and there were no fresh
supplies of ammunition or recruits reaching the insurgents from outside the
country.100
MacDonald believed that if British military operations had occurred on open
terrain rather than the jungle, “six weeks would have been sufªcient” to defeat
the uprising. Although he did not provide the Committee with a timeline for
success, the tenor of his remarks conveyed optimism: “At present British
forces were engaged in exterminating them [the MCP] in isolated groups.”101
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and Minds, p. 61, says that “lower level cadres” took matters “into their own hands.” According to
Chin Peng, the murders were a “mistake.” Interview with John Davis, who commanded the British
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Conclusion
Six weeks, of course, stretched into twelve years. Despite the MCP’s internal
problems, the lack of external assistance, and the party’s confused slide into
armed struggle, MCP insurgents were able to develop a base, drawing on re-
sidual support from non-Guomindang sections of the Chinese rural popula-
tion, to conduct guerrilla operations.102 As the acting U.S. secretary of state
noted at the end of 1948, “in Malaya, the British with up to 50,000 troops
under arms have been able to eliminate only about 500 guerrillas, this in the
course of an eight months campaign.”103 Britain’s inability to crush the guer-
rillas caused great frustration in London. In March 1950, Defence Minister
Emanuel Shinwell informed the prime minister that he was “very disturbed”
by the “grave” situation in Malaya.104 Two months later, the British govern-
ment’s Malaya Committee learned that it should expect “for a very consider-
able time . . . a rapid recrudescence of terrorist activity” and that Britain must
avoid “the danger of relaxing security precautions and of prematurely with-
drawing troops.”105 Anxiety became intense after the insurgents ambushed
and assassinated the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, in Octo-
ber 1951. That same month saw the highest number of casualties among the
security forces since 1949. An internal report prepared in 1957 acknowl-
edged, “There is no doubt that in the ªrst two years of its activities the CTO
[Communist Terrorist Organization] was a very real threat to the security and
economic recovery of Malaya after the war.”106
The two warring parties, however, were not evenly matched. From 1949
on, the Attlee and Churchill administrations committed much greater quanti-
ties of resources, military personnel, and U.S.-made weaponry to the war. In
1950 the British secretary of state for war, John Strachey, declared: “I do not
believe that the Army alone, as such, can ªnish them off. In order to ªnish
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103. Cable, 30 December 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. VI, p. 615.
104. Shinwell to Atlee, 27 March 1950, No. 1A, CAB 21/2510, NAUK. Shinwell successfully pushed
for the creation of a Cabinet Malaya Committee, which met regularly throughout 1950.
105. Malaya Committee Report, Appendix, Parag. 28, 24 May 1950, MAL C(50)23, CAB 21/
1681,NAUK.
106. “Review of the Emergency in Malaya from June 1948 to August 1957 by the Director of Opera-
tions, Malaya” (Secret), p. 7, 1968/4248, A452/2, NAA.
them off we have got to have a large military effort . . . and an equally large
police and administrative and political effort.”107 The counterinsurgency em-
ployed a range of strategies and fought on a number of fronts. Four compo-
nents of the strategy are worth highlighting. First, a “hearts and minds” cam-
paign, adapted to local conditions, was initiated by General Sir Gerald
Templer, the British High Commissioner from February 1952.108 This cam-
paign severed the umbilical cord between the MCP and its sources of food, re-
cruitment, and intelligence. The insurgents, once isolated from their support
base, were far more vulnerable to British military operations. Second, Britain
launched a major “population control” effort involving the relocation of more
than 50,000 Chinese “squatters,” the creation of nearly 450 “New Villages,”
and the mass deportations of detainees.109 Third, the British and Australians
reªned their aerial warfare by dropping “safe conduct” passes accompanied by
seductive promises of monetary rewards to encourage or accelerate defections.
Aerial drops of millions of “strategic” leaºets, including handwritten letters
and photographs from surrendered guerrillas, were used in conjunction with
“voice-aircraft” to personalize propaganda.110 British and Australian planes
also dropped 1,000-pound bombs, chemical defoliants, and napalm on or
near jungle camps.111 Fourth, the British developed an efªcient, synchronized
intelligence apparatus by restructuring the Special Branch and giving it a large
budget to pay informers. Sophisticated “black” propaganda and psychological
operations were coordinated by Hugh Carlton Greene, MI6, and the Infor-
mation Research Department from Phoenix Park (Commissioner-General
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MacDonald’s headquarters) in Singapore under the rubric of “Emergency In-
formation Services.”112
The efªcacy of each of these programs in defeating the Communist in-
surgency in Malaya continues to be a source of considerable debate. Never-
theless, regardless of the precise contribution of each of the components, the
combined impact of them was profound. In 1955, Chin Peng made a futile
offer to negotiate a settlement, and by 1958 the morale of the MCP had col-
lapsed. In 1960 Chin Peng, still with a large price on his head and accompa-
nied by a small “hard core” of followers, moved to southern Thailand, where
he and other remnants of the MCP hid, trained new cadres, and carried out
hit-and-run guerrilla attacks along the northern Malay peninsula for the next
twenty-ªve years. A ªnal peace agreement was eventually signed on 2 Decem-
ber 1989. By then, the Cold War was over, and Malaysia had been independ-
ent for thirty-two years. However, as this article has attempted to show, Cold
War concerns about the spread of Communism shaped judgments about the
inception of the Malayan Emergency. Future disclosures from the Russian ar-
chives may alter the conclusions presented here, but at least for now the role
of the Soviet Union in guiding these events seems clearly to have been over-
stated.113
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